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Marc van der Meer*  
Labour Market Reform in the Dutch Construction Industry: 
Lessons for Germany? ** 
In this article, Dutch labour market reform is related to collective bargaining 
processes. Based on evidence from recent fieldwork in the construction industry in 
the Netherlands, it is proposed that a useful theory of wage-setting should include, 
apart from economic contracts, wage norms and political coordination better to 
understand its impact in the labour market. The paper explains why and to what 
extent interest organisations in the Dutch construction industry have developed an 
active labour market policy (‘Bouw-vak-werk’) over a period of two decades with 
interesting positive results. Finally, five comparative lessons are drawn with 
particular emphasis to the German construction industry. 
Arbeitsmarktreform in der niederländischen Bauindustrie: Lehren für 
Deutschland? 
Reformen des niederländischen Arbeitsmarktes werden in diesem Beitrag mit 
Prozessen der Tärifverhandlungen in Beziehung gesetzt. Basierend auf 
Untersuchungen in der Bauwirtschaft in den Niederlanden wird vorgeschlagen, daß 
eine geeignete Theorie der Tarifverträge nicht nur ökonomische Verträge, sondern 
auch Tarifnormen und politische Koordination berücksichtigen muß, um ihre 
Bedeutung für den Arbeitsmarkt zu verstehen. Damit kann erklärt werden, weshalb 
und in welchem Ausmaß Interessengruppen in der niederländischen Bauwirtschaft 
innerhalb einer Dekade eine aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik (‘Bouw-Vak-Werk’) mit 
bemerkenswerten positiven Resultaten betrieben haben. Abschließend werden aus 
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1.  Introduction1 
The Dutch labour market performance is full of paradoxes. There exists general 
international recognition for the extent of job creation and the low level of 
unemployment. Employment creation, calculated according to the number of persons, 
has been ‘markedly better’ over the last decade as compared to most other Western 
countries, except the United States (OECD, 1998; EC, 1998). Younger people with 
modern skills and women entering the labour market especially benefit from the job 
creation, though more than two thirds of the net jobs created have been on a part time 
basis. The standardised unemployment level is currently 5.5% (449,000 persons related 
to an active labour force of 7.6 million), at the lowest level since 1981. On the flip side 
of the coin, there is a large share of long term unemployment in total unemployment, 
especially of younger people and ethnic migrants. Labour market participation of older 
people aged over 55 years is also low. Finally, there is the national dilemma of having 
more than 900,000 disabled persons. Meanwhile notices in the press at the moment of 
writing suggest that a shortage is appearing in some segments of the labour market, 
especially for skilled craft workers, nurses and information specialists, reaffirming the 
current labour market mismatch. 
The literature argues that within the Netherlands, the vicious circle of welfare 
without work, a factor present in many western welfare states, was broken down over 
a period of less than two decades due to the application of continuous responsible 
wage-setting, and a change of policy institutions in the fields of social security and 
labour market policy. Visser and Hemerijck (1997) explain the adaptation of Dutch 
policy institutions through the concept of ‘policy learning’ under the conditions of 
corporatist wage-setting. In short, the main political leaders and spokespersons of 
interest associations for labour and management have gradually changed their 
policies in different fields in order to find an answer to international competition and 
the overburdened welfare state. 
In this article, the whole process of adaptation will be reviewed, with particular 
attention not to national politics, but to the level of one particular sector of activity. The 
sector of construction will be studied because here job creation is in principle possible 
due to the small size of most firms; its project related work organisation of flexible 
specialisation and the occupational nature of its labour market. This text brings forward 
two main analytical contributions. First, as suggested by Streeck (1992: 31), the focus 
of the article will be on collective wage-setting in which trade unions and 
(representatives of) enterprises determine both the employment conditions and the 
economic performance in the domain of the agreement. Secondly, collective bargaining 
will be studied as a process and interpreted as a particular type of learning process for 
labour market reform in which, apart from information problems, social norms and 
political coordination are also important (Van der Meer, 1998). 
                                                          
1  Comments by Linda Clarke, Chris Moll and Jelle Visser are gratefully acknowledged. 
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The relation between collective bargaining and positive labour market 
performance is far from obvious, especially since the rise of unemployment in the 
Western world from the early 1970s. I am particularly interested in evaluating 
whether collective bargaining favours the interests of insiders with fixed seniority 
positions over the interests of outsiders, who are looking for a job and prepared to 
accept work at a wage under the collective agreement. In economic literature, 
MacDonald and Solow (1981) argue that union wage demands in single-employer 
bargaining result in higher wages, inflation and unemployment, although the level is 
dependent on the preferences of unions. In the case of multi-employer bargaining at 
sector level, conclusions have been evaluated using research, which combines both 
variables on trade union organisation, the level of collective bargaining and labour 
market performance. Until the mid 1980s, a positive relation attached to the degree in 
which countries were organised along corporatist lines and the scores on Okun’s 
‘misery’-index (Bruno and Sachs, 1985). The influential article of Calmfors and 
Driffel (1988) amended this view. These authors distinguish between three levels of 
wage-setting. National wage-setting (such as in the Scandinavian countries) and 
single-employer wage-setting at enterprise level (such as in the United States and the 
United Kingdom) lead, according to these authors, to the best employment results. 
Wage-setting at sectoral level (as in the Netherlands and Germany and the topic of 
analysis in this article) provides less well-defined results, since rent-seeking strategies 
of trade unions will maximise their incomes while externalising inflation. After 
severe criticism, especially by Soskice (1990), Rowthorn et al. (1992) and Calmfors 
(1993), the OECD (1997) argues that the relation between the level of collective 
bargaining and labour market performance has not yet been fixed.  
Collective bargaining is a process of decision-making which contains in itself 
game-theory characteristics, in which interest associations will reach results 
dependent upon their preferences and institutional positions (Elster, 1989; Rojer, 
1996). The existing literature is relatively unaware of the empirical relevance of the 
agenda-setting and change of preferences of trade unions and employers’ 
associations. The problem of agenda-setting is perhaps more complex than the 
process of negotiation itself.2 The question is how these preferences can be studied 
over a longer period of time. Robert Flanagan (1993) argues in his study of trade 
union behaviour that ‘nowhere in economics have the objectives of an agent been 
modelled with less attention to foundations than in the study of unions’ (Flanagan, 
1993:10).  
I will approach collective bargaining as a specific type of decision-making, 
where social learning takes place. The theoretical hypothesis presented here is drawn 
from ongoing debates in economics and the social and political sciences. In this 
paper, I will argue that modern neo-classical economics on collective bargaining 
                                                          
2  Elster (1989) doubts whether the problem of agenda-setting can be generalised in a coherent 
theoretical framework. The problem is the large number of variables and the difficulty in 
abandoning the ceteris paribus clause. This point is also underlined by North, but is not 
answered by him: ‘Preferences change, but we do not know how’ (North, 1990: 84).  
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benefit from arguments from the sociological fields of ‘social norms’ and political 
theory in what I call ‘political co-ordination’. To start with, collective agreements are 
seen as ‘economic contracts’ that serve as an efficient solution to the problem of 
market externalities, such as uncertainty about wage costs (Hicks, 1963; MacDonald 
and Solow, 1981). Here, I will combine the analysis of wage-setting with procedures 
of internal decision-making that reduce information costs (Flanagan, Moe and 
Wallerstein, 1994). I propose a two-folded addition to neo-classical theory. 
The first argument is to include social norms into the analysis. Solow argued 
that in order to explain why wages do not vary with changes in demand and supply, 
theories accepted nowadays on efficiency wages, trade unions, and insider-outsider 
models should be enriched with social norms (Solow, 1990). The concept of ‘social 
norms’ draws above all on sociological research, and refers to the absolute and 
relative opinions and expectations of (groups of) people with regard to how they are 
expected to behave in work relations given their existing employment conditions. 
Social norms are sustained through the approval and disapproval of other people who 
share the same norm. Such norms are both implicitly and explicitly present in the 
individual employment relation between an employer and an employee, as well as in 
the decision-making process surrounding collective wage-setting (Elster, 1989; 
Swenson, 1989). 
‘Political coordination’ is a concept that has been borrowed from the political 
science literature on neo-corporatism and political decision-making. The theoretical 
problem with interest associations is that their behaviour cannot be analysed in a 
micro-economic analytical framework alone, basically because processes of 
membership and decision-making are mixed up (Schmitter and Streeck, 1981). In this 
perspective, trade union organisations are political organisations: trade union leaders 
must win the re-election of their mandates and can have other preferences and wishes 
from those of the members. The organisational formation on the employers’ side is 
even more difficult, since firms not only compete on the labour market, but also on the 
product market (Streeck, 1992: 105-136). This implies that in collective bargaining, 
rather than the application of any maximisation principle (Dunlop, 1944), the methods 
of decision-making should be the central topic of study (Ross, 1948: 18). The question 
is how decision-making should be studied? Political coordination focuses on the 
position of, and relations between, state organisations and interest associations that 
influence the regulation of labour in society. This concept captures both the ‘hard’ 
regulative role of the state and its ‘soft’ mediating role (Regini, 1995). The positions of 
these institutions vary according to the extent of state intervention and the degree of 
self-regulation by interest associations in the market process. Political coordination 
then refers to the ability of political and social actors to influence the regulation of the 
market process, which is facilitated by the government. 
The importance of the concepts of economic contracts, wage norms and political 
coordination can only be estimated with empirical support from a historical 
perspective. In the study of collective bargaining, I have focused on the behaviour of 
collective interest organisations by asking whether the organisations representing 
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insider workers in the wage-setting process take into account the interests of outsider 
workers. In order to study this question I had to intensively study group formation 
and collective action in the process of collective bargaining. A related question was 
whether decentralisation of wage-setting process leads to the underprovision of 
collective goods, such as employment programmes, apprenticeship systems and 
vocational training. It will be asked which actors are responsible for the definition of 
the main targets for sectoral labour market policy, who delivers the means and 
instruments, and how policy was implemented in the Dutch construction industry 
over the period 1982 to 1998. The choice for a sector as the level of analysis has the 
advantage that the relation between the decision-making structure in the sector and 
economic performance can be studied (Schmitter, 1990). The outcome of the 
decision-making process is a time path with a certain chance structure for jobs, in a 
sector suffering from large and persistent unemployment.  
The general question in this paper is: ‘What solutions have interest associations 
in the Dutch construction industry found in answer to the situation of rising 
unemployment, how can these solutions be explained, and what is the learning effect 
of the solutions for labour market outcomes in the Netherlands and Germany?’ The 
text will focus on the establishment and change in the sectoral employment 
programme ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ (Construction Trade Work) which was created in 1989. 
The initiative serves as an example to underline a more general argument on 
governance structures and economic performance from a comparative Dutch-German 
perspective. In the text, I restrict attention to economic contracts, wage norms and 
political coordination. I abstain from discussing other social norms such as work 
ethic, norms on cooperation, group effort and leadership etc.  
The paper is organised as follows: In the following section I will introduce the 
construction sector; in section three I ask whether unemployment is a common 
concern; in section four I discuss some normative aspects; in section five political 
relations are introduced; in section six an experiment is explained; in section seven 
conclusions are drawn on ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ and in section eight some lessons for 
Germany are brought forward.  
2.  Interest representation in the Dutch construction industry 
The construction industry is important in terms of production and employment 
in the Dutch economy, covering different branches of activity, especially the building 
industry (the construction of dwellings and offices) and civil engineering (the 
construction of roads, railways, dikes, water infrastructure). In addition, there are 
related branches such as the installation sector, the supply industry, the architects and 
advisory consultants. The volume of production and employed labour force varies 
over the years. Since the Second World War, building labour has first expanded to a 
maximum of 409,000 in 1979 and a decline to 285,000 in 1983. In the early 1980s, 
unemployment in the sector rose sky high (see below), whereas also other exit 
mechanisms from the labour market such as early retirement, disability and out-flow 
to other sectors have been used. Currently, some 449,000 people work in 19,000 
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firms. About 99% of all firms have less than 100 employees. The vast majority of the 
workforce is men working full time. The number of ethnic migrants and women in 
the sector is very low. Moreover, similar to Germany, the number of unskilled 
workers has declined.3 In the Netherlands, in contrast to Germany, no 
‘Handwerksrecht’ (a law governing the trades) exists, whereas competition law has 
been liberalised in 1996. It should be added that construction firms have changed 
their recruitment strategies. In the ‘quasi-firms’ (Eccless, 1981) of the construction 
sector, general contractors coordinate and manage the work process and consequently 
contract out most of the executing work to smaller specialised subcontractors. In the 
latter category of firms, a rising section of employment is concentrated. Finally, 
unlike in Germany, the number of illegal foreign workers is low, while the category 
of the self-employed is growing in importance indicating the increasing 
flexibilisation of labour (Clarke and Wall, 1996: 49).4 In the mid-term, 
notwithstanding economic growth, the employment level in the construction industry 
remains constant, due to the introduction of labour saving pre-fabrication 
technologies. As a consequence, the position of the skilled workforce is relatively 
stable, most work on a full time basis under permanent labour contracts. In Table 1., 
some statistics are compared for both countries. 
Table 1.  Labour market statistics in Germany and The Netherlands (1997) 
(Source: OECD, Labour force statistics, 1977-1997) 
 The Netherlands Germany 
Wage earners in construction (1997) 385,000 2,984,000 
Civilian employment in construction (1997) 449,000 3,304,000 
Total labour force (1997) 7,673,000 39,602,000 
Total number of unemployed (1997) 423,000 3,863,000 
Standardised unemployment rate (%) (1997) 5.5% 9.8% 
   
Gross value added/ employee in construction (ECU/ 1992) (*) 35,100 37,500 
(*) EIB, 1995:44. 
In the Dutch construction sector, there are different patterns of interest 
organisation and representation. Dutch employers’ associations and unions are 
addressed as ‘social partners’ or ‘social parties’. The construction unions, the socialist 
‘Bouw- en Houtbond FNV’ (164,000 members) and ‘Hout- en Bouwbond CNV’ 
(40,000 members) are well organised with an average membership of 40%, which 
exceeds the 28% national average (data: 1997). This rate is the consequence of an 
institutional characteristic in the sector, whereby the unions until 1997 had a personal 
                                                          
3  See Clarke and Wall, 1996, p.46-47. 
4  From 1987-1995 the number of self-employed people rose by 65% in the whole construction 
industry (excluding the installation branch). The labour volume of the self-employed as a 
whole includes 54,000 full time equivalents, nearly 14% of the labour force in the sector. The 
self-employed earn about 4-5% of the total turnover (EIB, 1998b).  
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delegate in the execution of social security schemes (for unemployed, sick people) at 
local level, which facilitated membership recruitment (see also Rothstein, 1992). In 
addition, there are several smaller unions for machinists and for staff personnel that 
are not considerated. 
Enterprises are well organised in informal co-operative circuits and in many 
different employers’ associations. Van Waarden (1989) counted 220 different trade 
and employers’ associations at national and regional level (data 1980). Now, as the 
result of a process of amalgamation and scale enlargement, there are in addition to 
many trade associations, 30 distinct employers’ associations (Jaarboek SFB, 1998). 
Within the sector three umbrella organisations are to be found. Eight of the 
employers’ associations of main contractors are affiliated to the Federation of Dutch 
Contractors’ Organisations (AVBB).5 
Wage-setting within the construction industry in the Netherlands (as in 
Germany) is an issue of nation-wide sectoral bargaining. Trade unions and 
employers’ associations (bi-) annually bargain over wages and employment 
conditions. Agreements are extended by erga-omnes clauses, which means that non-
organised workers are also covered by the agreement. In the Netherlands, collective 
bargaining has been publicly protected since 1927; its provisions are routinely 
extended to non-organised firms by the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment. 
In the Netherlands today collective wage-setting occurs free of government 
intervention, although the Wage Act of 1970 (changed in 1987) permits specific 
wage-freezing measures, in the case of significant economic decline.6 Contrary to 
Germany, at national level in the Netherlands, joint institutions (the bi-partite 
Foundation of Labour and the tri-partite Social Economic Council) offer a platform 
for consultation and agenda-setting for the renewal of public policies. Since the 
Wassenaar Agreement (1982) signed between central employers’ and employees’ 
organisations, wage-setting has been decentralised in a process of ‘controlled 
decentralisation’. The important role of government in the formulation of the basic 
framework of the labour market should however not be underestimated. In recent 
years in particular the criteria for access to sickness and disability funds have been 
restricted following a parliamentary inquiry on the abundant (mis)use of these 
programmes (see Buurmeijer, 1993; Zeijen, 1993). More recently, several social 
security provisions have been privatised, laying responsibility for sickness leave with 
the individual employer. 
In the construction sector, there are 11 collective agreements in different 
domains. Perhaps the most important is the collective agreement for executive 
                                                          
5  Additionally there are two smaller umbrella organisations for subcontracting firms, i.e. 
FAANB and CONGA. In February 1999, an organisation for self-employed construction 
workers without personnel was established. These organisations do not play a role in the 
present discussion. 
6  In case of significant economic decline, the government may threaten a wage freeze to a 
maximum of two times six months. 
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manual workers in the construction sector, which covers 150,000 workers in both 
building and civil engineering. Supervisory, technical and administrative staff 
personnel (40,000 persons) in building and civil engineering have their own 
collective agreement. Separate collective agreements also exist for painting, finishing 
and glass workers; natural stone workers; wet grind dredge personnel; mortar 
transport workers; plasterers; plumbers, fitting and heating personnel; roofing 
workers; and dredge personnel. With regard to foreign construction workers under 
the Posted Workers Directive, the Dutch collective agreement has to be applied after 
one month (see Eichhorst, 1998). 
In the Dutch construction industry, probably more than other industrial 
branches, market-like criteria have always regulated wage formation and labour 
allocation. Already in the 1950s and 1960s, decades famous for their strong state-
intervention in Dutch wage-determination, wages in the construction industry 
exhibited fluctuations far above average and frequently went beyond the government-
prescribed range. 
Self-regulation and industrial self-government in the construction industry have 
always been very strong. Both unions and employers’ associations take part in sector 
specific bi-partite organisations with self-regulating collective funds. These funds are 
financed by enterprises and workers themselves, the total balance-sheet amounting to 
the enormous sum of 100 billion Dutch guilders. Currently there are collective funds 
for social security, pensions, holiday, temporary winter weather lay-offs, voluntary 
early retirement, health and safety, vocational education and training, research and 
development, general policy consultation (Bouwberaad), and also employment 
policy. 
3.  Rising unemployment: a common concern? 
During the early 1980s, unemployment in the Netherlands rose faster than in 
other western countries (Therborn, 1986). In June 1984, the Building and Wood 
Union FNV initiated a new sectoral approach for labour market reform. Although not 
the first initiative, the report served as a catalyst. The trade union proposed the 
‘regulation of the entry stream of employees into the sector’. This regulation is not 
meant in terms of ‘restriction or selection’, but as a form of ‘steering’ (FNV, 1984).  
The proposal estimated that there were 75,000 unemployed in the construction 
sector alone. The union evaluated many policy initiatives current at the time. In line 
with the so-called ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ (1982), in which the social partners at 
national level had decided to exchange labour time reduction for benefit restoration, 
the construction union pleaded for a reduction in labour time. At the same time, it 
noted that a substantial reduction in labour time (of 5% in 1985) would only be 
sufficient as compensation for employment loss due to productivity increases. 
Policies attempting to reduce overtime, the increase of additional holidays, or a 
reduction of early retirement to the age of 60 years would not be sufficient to bring 
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the ‘army’ of unemployed workers (among which 46% were for a period longer than 
one year) back to paid work. According to the union, two main alternatives prevailed. 
First, the exit from the construction sector to other sectors should be encouraged. 
The union argued that construction workers can be trained for administrative work 
within the construction industry, or be placed in jobs outside the sector. In addition, 
the age for early retirement should be lowered to 55 years. For the union, an 
unemployed person of 56 years old is a different case from an early-retired person of 
the same age, the latter belonging to a more acceptable category (with better financial 
conditions). 
Secondly, and more importantly, the construction union pointed to a specific 
population of long term unemployed who might execute additional construction 
work. This fitted well into the traditional idea of Keynesian investment in 
infrastructure and city renovation that until 1983 was official government policy. The 
contribution of the report by the construction union was to define specific criteria for 
these target groups. Those unemployed who are out of work for more than one year, 
those older than 40 or 45 years of age, and those willing to receive additional training 
when needed, should be registered, in order to get insight in the nature, regional 
spread and skill competence of these categories. This system of screening and giving 
access to the sector should be administered in a bi-paritarian system, conceivably 
with help from the regional employment office. As such, the construction union FNV 
introduced a distinction in categories of unemployed. This represented a revolution in 
the trade union movement.  
No response to the FNV-report was made before November 1984. Then, the 
smaller CNV-union supported the initiative of FNV to develop a vision to reduce the 
‘gigantic unemployment’ (CNV, 1984). In contrast to FNV, it considered itself 
unable to indicate the level of unemployment since ‘nobody knows to what extent 
unemployment is of a conjunctural or structural nature’. The trade union added that it 
was also ‘hazardous from a social and tactical point of view’ to mention the number 
of 75,000 unemployed, since this would be particularly demoralising for the currently 
large amount of unemployed craftsmen. It might also have a negative effect on the 
government, which had different perceptions on how to increase investment to create 
jobs.  
The CNV argued against being too pessimistic since the conjuncture would 
straighten out again. It proposed four arguments, in line with those of the FNV. The 
union encouraged Keynesian investment politics, additional training for those 
needing it, the expansion of early retirement, and research on the regulation of the 
influx into the sector. Like FNV, the CNV favoured demanding clear requirements on 
skill competencies from workers. 
The employers’ association AVBB made known that it discussed in its own 
circles ‘drastic and non-habitual measures’ against the unemployment problem. It did 
not totally agree with FNV, but supported a mutual approach. In contrast to the union, 
the AVBB distinguished between two definitions of structural unemployment. The 
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first isolated structural unemployment as being the difference between the trend (or 
average) employment and the available labour supply. The AVBB opted for a second 
definition that started not from the average level of employment, but from the 
maximal level of employment (at the time of a high conjuncture). Structural 
unemployment is, in this case, maximal employment (at high conjuncture) minus 
labour supply. This definition prevailed since the employers perceived scarcity and 
wage increase in the labour market as unacceptable. 
The employers subsequently estimated structural unemployment for the year 
1989 (i.e. five years later) at 50,000 to 55,000 persons (irrespective of their skill 
levels). If the government and social partners were to stimulate construction 
investment, unemployment would decline to 15,000. For job seekers, an additional 
labour market policy was needed. Therefore, the AVBB wanted to know both the 
composition and skill levels of the unemployed, and whether or not they every now 
and then undertook concrete construction work. Qualitative aspects were seen as 
especially important, since ‘in their decided opinion, a closer evaluation of the files 
would make clear that only a restricted number of people could be classified as a real 
part of the labour force of the sector on the basis of education, length of service, and 
personal characteristics’ (AVBB, 1984: 4).  
4.  Social norms put at a test 
Both trade unions and employers’ associations supported the idea of a common 
sectoral approach to unemployment. The employers agreed with the unions that the 
regional public employment service, though being the ‘first proper instance’, was not 
capable of handling the matter. The employers proposed in line with the trade union, 
to establish ‘teams for judgement’, composed of individual employers and workers 
representatives, to make the files in the Public Employment Service transparent. 
Subsequently, they sought to influence the intermediation and allocation of the 
unemployed via a newly established organisation. In cases where training was 
required, the government should be responsible, although the sectoral training 
institutes should remain in the hands of the social partners. 
However, the organisations diverged in their views regarding how large 
unemployment actually was, and for what unemployment categories an initiative had 
to be taken. The employers proposed to distinguish between the ‘real labour stock’ 
and those unemployed who more or less ‘by coincidence’ were registered as 
unemployed craftsmen in previous times, who had -due to the then overstrung labour 
market- found a construction job but could no longer be conceived as part of the real 
labour force in the sector. The employers denied any responsibility for these other 
categories whom they considered should be placed under state supervision. It sought 
to take responsibility for three categories of unemployed whom, in short: 
1. Had some degree of vocational training, gained under the auspices of social 
partners in the sector; 
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2. Had undertaken work, at the time of becoming unemployed, that was essential and 
recognisable as part of the building process, for a period of five years without 
interruption; 
3. Had performed work, over a period of 15 years prior to current unemployment, at 
least ten years under similar criteria as to those in point two above.  
The employers’ association restricted its focus to the unemployed meeting the 
requirements, whereas the unions wanted to defend the interests of all unemployed 
construction workers. The sector abstained from responsibility for national 
unemployment, which they believed is under the responsibility of government. 
There were also normative differences in the required instruments. The 
employers argued that the trade unions have unjustly failed to address the ‘current 
high wage level’. This was an important argument since unions have some normative 
principles in wage-setting, which include in the Netherlands, among others, the need 
for automatic price compensation, an equal wage increase for all workers, and no 
application of productivity wages (For Germany, see Swenson, 1989). 
In addition, the employers’ association anticipated that for the target group 
particular ‘policies for elderly people, part time work, and even a general labour time 
reduction’ would also be needed. On the other hand, they were of the opinion that the 
‘total force should be reduced, for example by not replacing the natural turnover, or 
via an active retraining programme’ (AVBB, 1984; 7). Moreover the employers 
claimed, in contrast to the unions, entry thresholds based on an obligatory (medical) 
test and a test for career choice. They stated that early retirement at the age of 55 
years is too drastic and too expensive. The employers argued for a structural decline 
in labour capacity, and did not want to support trade union proposals for Keynesian 
investment in construction projects, which might lead to undesirable substitution of 
regulars by additional construction work.  
 
5.  The political coordination in the sector 
The reports of FNV (June 1984), CNV (November 1984) and AVBB 
(November 1984) were discussed in a special meeting of the ‘Bouwberaad’, the 
paritarian sectoral body for strategic consultation and deliberation, which was 
established in the late 1970s. In December 1984, a specific bi-partarian working 
group composed of FNV, CNV and AVBB, under the chair of a personnel director of 
a large construction company, received the order to develop a sectoral policy 
approach. From that moment, the construction sector began its own policy approach, 
in which the rank and file of the employers’ and trade union associations had the final 
vote. Of particular relevance was the division of labour between the work of the 
commission (regarding personnel staffing in the sector) and the collective bargaining 
processes in the sector (where costs contained in labour time reduction and early 
retirement were dealt with). In turn, the commission could build upon sectoral 
research on qualitative aspects of the unemployed (EIB, 1986) and national 
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discussion on the future of the public employment service (that was changed in 1991) 
(SER, 1985).  
It took a full year for the commission’s proposals to apply ‘exactly formulated 
criteria for the determination of the extent and composition of the real labour force’. 
In addition, the commission proposed to develop a sectoral policy for ‘training, pools 
and labour intermediation’. Finally, the commission suggested to match demand and 
supply by controlling access via a ‘letter of inscription’ in a General Construction 
Register (ABB) and via training of employed and unemployed workers who met the 
necessary requirements. The criteria for access corresponded to the proposals of the 
employers’ association: a rounded skill formation, 5 years of continuous work 
experience, or 10 out of 15 years work experience. On the basis of EIB–research, an 
additional criterion for younger people under 25 years was added: younger people 
who had terminated primary vocational education in construction were also allowed 
to take part.  
In other words, the Commission chose to give priority to the real labour stock, to 
become active in the matching of supply and demand, to train those unemployed who 
met the necessary requirements, and to apply for a medical test. This system was 
believed to contain advantages and obligations for both sides. The employees would 
have the advantage of an improved chance to obtain work, given the active matching. 
The unemployed would have the opportunity of additional training. They would have 
to accept both training and work when available. For employers, the advantages 
included a sufficient supply of skilled labour, more flexible staffing and an improved 
relationship with the Public Employment Service. As a quid pro quo, the employers 
were required to announce any vacancies and to give priority to the unemployed 
within the ABB-system over those outside the system. 
By early 1986, the common agenda was full of complexity. Questions at stake 
included: At what (national, regional, local) level should the new structure be 
erected? What registration and intermediation procedures should be developed? How 
should the training of the unemployed be organised? Should pools for the 
unemployed be created? What should be the material compensation for those in the 
target group? In the Bouwberaad meeting of March 1986, some fundamental 
differences again emerged. The trade unions wanted to take responsibility for all 
unemployed in the sector (where they added in their text ‘for the time being’ 
restricting their attention to a specific group given the extent of the problems), the 
employers’ association explicitly wished to restrict the analysis to those meeting the 
criteria. The employers did not want to talk anymore on the ‘remaining category’, 
since this might ‘emotionally arouse resistance, which may restrict the realisation of 
the proposals’. All these points continued to be under open discussion. First, 
however, the government and the employers’ association for subsidiary work 
(FAANB), which until then had remained outside the discussion, now were also 
consulted. 
The FAANB was invited to join as a member of the Commission Structural 
Unemployment, under the strict condition that the establishment of the collective 
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agreement (on wages, hours etc.) ‘is provided to partners’, as it is referred to within 
the sector. From now on, FAANB basically fulfilled a role in extending the initiative 
from the building and infrastructure sector to other branches within the construction 
sector.  
The consultation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment was 
crucial for two reasons. First, the possible introduction of a sectoral distinction 
between a ‘core labour force’ and an ‘additional labour force’ would confront the 
government with a large stock of unemployed who were far removed from labour 
allocation. In the event that other sectors would also follow the initiative, the 
government would be compelled to fulfil the function of ‘broomwagon’ for the least 
qualified job seekers. Moreover, the question remained of whether the Public 
Employment Service should give up its monopoly on labour market intervention (a 
plan that at that time was not yet under discussion, but was effectuated in 1998). 
Especially, the government believed its own plans to decentralise the labour service 
(which was foreseen for 1991) were jeopardised. 
Secondly, the consultation of the government was crucial for the delicate issue 
of the general extension of wage agreements. This was a relevant point since FNV, 
CNV and AVBB have a substantial rank and file, but are anything but fully inclusive. 
General extension of collective agreements was needed to cover all firms. In addition, 
the relevant question remained what type of labour market would ensue once the new 
structure had been established. In theory it was imaginable that the social partners 
would establish a kind of closed shop, by regulating access and wages for all workers. 
This system was however totally unacceptable to both employers and government. A 
second alternative was a labour pool, for training, temporary work, and a permanent 
pool of unemployed similar to the ones already existing in the ports of Amsterdam, in 
the metal industry and in some regions in the construction sector (The Hague, 
Rotterdam, Groningen). In principle, the government was willing to support the idea 
of a labour pool that would not disturb the ordinary allocation process. The 
government also promised to extend the labour market reform to non-associated 
firms, on the condition that the labour reform would be incorporated in a collective 
agreement.  
6.  The reduction in the information problem 
After these first years of deliberation, the general idea had to be implemented. 
From March 1987 onwards, the sector initiated an experiment in two Dutch 
provinces, South-Holland and Friesland. The Commission for Structural 
Unemployment changed its name in the more positive ‘National Commision for 
Training, Employment and Labour Market’. Many meetings took place on 
conceptual, organisational, and secretarial aspects, as well as a plan for publicity. Of 
relevance was the issue concerning whether the new intervention structure should 
relate to the Dutch provincial structure or to the metropolitan structure of the Public 
Employment Service. Procedures and testing criteria should be developed to classify 
the unemployed. The announcement of vacancies and the functioning of the 
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intermediation should also be developed to circumscribe rights and obligations for 
firms, employees and those unemployed to undergo tests, training and work 
experience. All these issues were to be fixed in an annex to the collective wage 
agreement.  
At the level of the local Public Employment Service, small tri-partite 
commissions were created, made up of one representative from the unions, one 
employer, and one civil servant. The objective of the commissions was to invite all 
unemployed craftsmen for an interview in an effort to select and register them. The 
commission also linked job seekers to construction firms and training institutes. The 
responsibility for training remained in the hands of the sectoral vocational training 
institutes, which developed specific tests and additional training programmes for 
those meeting the criteria. The Public Employment Service retained its responsibility 
to determine labour market programmes for the remaining unemployed. 
One of the most important problems was how the commission would deal with 
the problems occurring, such as non-response, practical use, the objectivity and 
validity of the criteria, and evaluation in case of doubt for example, should the 
commission’s opinion not be unanimous. The work of these ‘street level bureaucrats’ 
is difficult to evaluate, but it seems that not only 91% of the candidates were accepted 
into the ABB-register on the basis of objective criteria, but an additional 9% was 
allowed into the sector on the basis of reasonable arguments. 
The results of the experiment are illuminating. Of the 4,462 unemployed 
interviewed, 3,302 (74%) were allowed directly into the sectoral labour force, some 
directly on the basis of criteria, others on the basis of an interview.7 In the media, the 
president of the regional employers’ association in The Hague, who was involved in 
the experiment, argued that ‘most of the unemployed cannot be turned into 
craftsmen’. For the CNV-union however, this was ‘premature’ and ‘demagogy’ since 
the unemployed might still be brought into a job (De Opbouw, May 1987). Half a 
year later, the final results were published: ‘Only a quarter of the unemployed 
construction workers are prepared to undertake a job in the sector, 50% do not want 
to or are not prepared to execute work in construction, the last quarter is already 
working, but is not deleted from the files of job seekers’. The employers now gave a 
much more modest comment: ‘a moral obligation rests on the sector to treat as 
priority those people who take part and are loyal to the lead of the sector’ (NVOB, 
June 1988). 
The outcome of the experiment encouraged social partners to introduce the 
‘Bouw-vak-werk’ program on a national scale. The National Commission for 
Training, Employment, and Labour Market formulated some compromises, but FNV 
and AVBB still disagreed. The employers sought to remove the distinction between 
                                                          
7  Of the 1,160 (26%) persons not allowed into the ABB-register; 26% did not appear in the 
interviews; 39% did not belong to the construction work; 8% did not want to be tested; 14% 
did not have sufficient skills; 10% were incapacitated due to medical handicaps or an age over 
57.5 years; 4% had another job or were studying. 
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those inside and outside the ‘real force’ to settle the ‘prevailing opinion of the 
construction sector with the large pool of unemployment’. The employers supported 
training and work experience projects, which would conceivably be organised in a 
paritarian setting. For them, a ‘closed shop’ was however not acceptable, since it 
would give the workers a too strong position. Finally, the employers persisted in 
requiring a medical test, motivational aspects, and penalties in case of unwillingness 
by the unemployed to follow the indications of the tri-partite local commissions.  
The FNV stuck to its position of insisting that ‘subjective criteria’ (physical 
suitability and motivation) could not be tested. Moreover, it kept responding to the 
additional groups of unemployed not meeting the criteria. In addition, the 
unemployed should receive the right to a job. The trade union also argued that at local 
level, the allocation of job seekers should be procedurally regulated and companies 
failing to announce vacancies should be punished accordingly. 
All these issues were agreed upon in a compromise of the National Commission 
including the exact definition of the objective and subjective criteria, the eventual 
application of sanctions to unwilling employees and firms, and the concrete rights of 
persons allowed to participate in the scheme. Finally, the new system was to be 
financed and juridically anchored with respect to the relationship between the Public 
Employment Service, public training centres, sectoral organisations, and the sectoral 
training institutes (February 1989). The ‘soft’ mediation was translated into two types 
of ‘hard’ agreement. First, employment conditions for participants in the ‘Bouw-vak-
werk’ initiative were incorporated in the collective agreements between the unions 
and the employers’ association. Second, the relations between the sector and the 
Public Employment Service were laid down in a convenant with the Directorate 
General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. It was decided to 
participate in the ‘decentralisation’, ‘tripartisation’ and ‘demonopolisation’ of the 
Public Employment Service that was foreseen in 1991. ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ would have 
a small national headquarter and nine regional offices. These institutions were bi-
partarian in nature with an advisory role for state officials. At the level of the 
individual Public Employment Agencies, tri-partite commissions were established. 
These commissions were to invite the unemployed for an intake and to advise on their 
classification to determine whether or not they qualified for training and work 
experience projects. The unions and employers’ representatives in the commissions 
took the decisions, the state official played an advisory role.  
On May 25th. 1989, the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ convenant was underscribed by the 
employers’ associations AVBB and FAANB, the trade unions CNV and FNV, and 
the General Directorate for the Public Employment Service. In Figure 1., the new 
structure is described. The convenant covers four collective agreements: the 
construction sector, administrative personnel, painters, and natural stone. The projects 
began January 1990 with three concrete tasks:  
1. The trade unions and the employers sought to determine the exact extent of 
the population of workers by application of four criteria (five year of uninterrupted 
work experience, 10 out of 15 years work experience, a training qualification, and for 
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younger employees -those under 25 years of age- an initial qualification in vocational 
education). Moreover the commission was allowed to take unanimous decisions on 
the motivation and physical suitability of candidates for access to the scheme. 
Moreover a ‘general excuse’ was permitted during a transition period for all 
construction workers who between March 1990 and May 1993 had undertaken 
construction work for at least one day. Additionally, through collective bargaining the 
trade unions successfully demanded some material advantages for those in the ABB-
file. The unemployed within the system had priority in being matched to a job, had 
priority in training and received an additional social unemployment benefit (80% 
instead of 70% over eight weeks).  
2. The trade unions and the employers’ associations aimed at the development of 
training, pooling and active matching of those long-term unemployed. These plans 
were added in a special protocol to the different collective wage agreements. For 
example, in the agreement for construction workers, 2,000 places for training and 
work experience were granted. These places were established for both those 
unemployed within the labour force, and those with exceptional motivation. In 1990, 
1992, 1993 and 1995 moreover, specific training programmes for target groups, such 
as for women, ethnic minorities and handicapped people were initiated. 
 
Figure 1  The relation between ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ and the Public Employment Service 
 Source: Bouw-vak-werk 
 
 

































7.  Perspectives for ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ 
We have seen that when in 1983 the Keynesian investment programme in the 
Netherlands stopped, in the construction sector within a short time an active labour 
market programme was started to resolve the problem of excess unemployment. A 
trade union threw the first stone in the pond, the ripple-effect proving advantageous 
for the employers. ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ as a labour market instrument is particularly 
relevant in the discussion on collective wage-setting and labour market performance. 
In answer to our general research question, it seems that the agenda-setting and 
decision-making process regarding labour market instruments are indirectly linked to 
negotiations on hours and wages, since the parties involved in collective bargaining 
determine the task and the composition of the Commission for Structural 
Unemployment. The subcontracting firms and government were not invited to take 
part before 1986. The experiment in Friesland and South-Holland remained under the 
responsibility of these parties.  
The 1989 ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ convenant is warmly welcomed in the sector. The 
president of the FNV union considers ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ to be a new ‘pearl’ in Dutch 
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labour relations and the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, De Koning, 
expects a ‘substantial decline in unemployment’. The employers’ president of the 
National Commission argues that in 1989 unemployment remained at almost ‘nil’ (all 
quotes in Gruisen, 1996). In a recent evaluation, the sector itself concluded that 
‘Bouw-vak-werk’ is nothing short of successful: ‘it has improved knowledge on 
supply and demand in the short and the long run; it acts upon labour market 
mediation; agreements with municipalities have been created on labour market and 
work experience projects; the execution of job programmes was formulated in 
collective agreements; subsidies for training and job projects were used; forecasts on 
the preferred flow into the construction sector were made; and it affected the training 
capacity of the Public Employment Service’ (Hartveld, 1998: 75).  
Other evaluation studies are however less positive. For the Public Employment 
Service, the market share in labour market allocation increased only modestly.8 The 
same evaluation study concluded that only one fifth of employers in the sector was 
acquainted with the ABB-certificate, and only 58% were of opinion that this 
certificate was of any use, since it does not offer any guarantee for selection and 
workmanship of workers. Also the pooling, foreseen in the second task of ‘Bouw-
vak-werk’, perished in its implementation and many vacancies are not mentioned at 
all. Finally, the chances for ethnic migrants and unemployment to find paid work 
have not increased (CBA, 1995). 
The suggestion implied in the above-statements by the leaders in the sector that 
unemployment has been lowered due to the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’-programme is also not 
correct. It is not ‘Bouw-vak-werk’, but statistical definitions that determine the extent 
of unemployment, whereas the expanding economic conjuncture in the late 1980s and 
other labour market instruments such as labour time reduction and early retirement, 
helped to overcome the problem of unemployment.  
In the early 1990s, within the construction sector too, criticism was heard. Trade 
union cadres asked whether it was worthwhile to continue with expensive training 
programmes when the results were proving so meagre.9 However, the trade union 
leaders defended the significance of the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ as a possible example of 
the ‘job before wages’ norm identified in the national confederations of FNV and 
CNV. Also, within employers’ circles, the bureaucracy of the matching system and 
the ‘undesirable’ collectivisation of the sector felt under criticism. Subsequently, 
‘Bouw-vak-werk’ changed within the turbulent waves of revision in Dutch social 
security and labour market policies in the 1990s. In December 1995, employers 
                                                          
8  The market coverage (number of vacancies announced relative to the total number of 
vacancies) increased modestly from 31% in 1991 to 37% in 1993; the fulfilment quota (the 
number of vacancies fulfilled by the Public Employment Service relative to the total number 
of vacancies) grew from 54% in 1991 to 59% in 1993; the market share (market coverage 
multiplied by the fulfilment quota) rose from 17% in 1991 to 23% in 1993, while being 
somewhat higher in the construction sector than in other sectors (CBA, 1995). 
9  In the period up to 1995, 2,639 candidates were invited to be part of this new system, of 
which 1,620 persons actually started to receive training. 
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proposed to relate the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ to the new structure for social security in the 
Netherlands (AVBB, 1995b). This idea was executed in 1997, when ‘Bouw-vak-
werk’ was formed into a new ‘sector council’ for social security and active labour 
market policies. Employers’ associations and trade unions further developed a ‘one 
counter policy’ to obtain scale advantage and cost reduction.10 Their policy is to 
continue with the tri-partite local commissions, but to whittle down the overloaded 
top-structure, in order to achieve optimal personnel facilities for firms as well as 
optimal work security for employees.  
8.  Lessons for Germany? 
The establishment of the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ program in the construction industry 
was the result of a long process extended over many years in which the essential 
conditions for labour market performance were discussed. On the basis of the 
evaluation studies, we conclude positively that social partners have attempted to 
improve the position of both insiders and outsiders in the construction work force. On 
the other hand, the setting up of ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ illustrates how slow policy change 
is effected and how modest the results may be. The argument here, however, goes 
beyond the development of labour market policies. In answer to the second part of the 
general question of this paper, I wish to draw five comparative conclusions from a 
Dutch-German perspective (see also CPB, 1997). 
First, the establishment of ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ underlines the relation between 
governance institutions and economic performance. In Dutch politics, in contrast to 
German, several extra-parliamentary institutions operate, such as the tri-partite Social 
Economic Council and the bi-partite Foundation of Labour at national level, and the 
Bouwberaad at sectoral level. Within these consultative institutions, social partners 
have created opportunities for information exchange. During meetings, social-
economic developments are discussed, while at the same time building a database of 
relevant facts and figures. Meanwhile, members share concerns, opinions, thoughts 
and policy ideas. This results in common general knowledge on the social-economic 
situation and extends theoretical positions in relation to strategic choice. As a 
consequence, the economic situation (including questions on whether or not 
unemployment is a growing concern), is no longer a point of discussion in collective 
bargaining, whereas alternative strategic policies have become a topic for negotiation. 
For example, the origin of the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ initiative is not only politically 
embedded in the consultation economy, but also serves as an example of how 
different bargaining arenas relate to one other. When in 1985, for example, the 
National Commission was confronted with a stalemate in collective bargaining on 
labour time reduction, decision-making regarding ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ did not stop, but 
                                                          
10  This is a last irony since even in 1988, during the set-up of ‘Bouw-vak-werk’, this was under 
discussion (MinSZW, 1988), but was then vetoed by both the employers’ associations who 
didn’t want to connect the social security and labour market policies files, and the trade 
unions who were against eventual sanctions on job seekers. 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 6. Jg., Heft 3, 1999  379 
 
was only postponed. The ‘super structure’ in the sector (De Vilder, 1990) enabled 
negotiations to become efficient and initiatives to continue to receive a green light. 
As Streeck has argued, the establishment of a consultative platform is precisely the 
function that a new German ‘Bündnis für Arbeit’ may fulfil, a forum where social 
partners can talk and anticipate the needs for external adjustment (quoted in Giebels, 
1997, see also Visser, 1998). In the event that such a new consultative podium is 
created, legitimate results will only be obtained in the longer run, since participants 
will have to know each other well, by meeting regularly and sharing constructively 
alternative policy strategies. In addition, a legitimate basis for the ‘soft’ mediating 
aspects of political coordination, will be dependent on the representativeness of the 
participating organisations and concise evaluation of the implementation of new 
ideas. 
A second comparative point derives from the above argument on political 
coordination. A joint initiative of social partners generates a learning effect, with 
interesting unintended consequences for policy. In the paper, we have seen that the 
effects of ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ are moderate, primarily because recruitment processes of 
construction companies do not change in spite of the labour market reform. We 
therefore conclude that the labour market in the construction industry operates 
according to different principles than those that were initially believed. So, the whole 
‘Bouw-vak-werk’ initiative ruthlessly uncovers above all the impotence of the Public 
Employment Service state monopoly. ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ has thus come to represent a 
government failure. This conclusion may be hypothesised to be true too for the 
German Public Employment Service, judging from the available literature on the 
German construction sector that points to the existence of informal networks of 
recruitment (Jansen/Hochstadt, 1998). In addition, this does not imply that the 
construction sector does not continue to favour close relations with the state, 
especially in demanding public investment and the general extension of collective 
wage agreements. For this reason, ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ was adapted to the new 
government’s labour market structure in 1991. Yet, ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ while 
executing public tasks, includes an unforeseen consequence. The social partners in 
the sector have become aware that mutual commitment, knowledge and basis among 
their rank and file, are necessary conditions for institutional change to prosper. 
Considering that in the near future the Dutch Public Employment Service will be 
further dismantled (as is now a government proposal, see parliament nr.26,448, 
1999), social partners will have sufficient learning experience to bring new common 
policies to successful fruition. 
Thirdly, the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ experiment underlines the importance of and 
change in social norms. The social partners have continued ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ in spite 
of initial normative disagreements. Following five years of discussion, the 
participants themselves agreed to base their cooperation upon ‘the acknowledgement 
of each other’s insights, capabilities, opportunities and rights’ (Press notice, 1989). 
This agreement directly refers to the literature on neo-corporatism in which social 
partners mediate their interests and accept the other actor as a bargaining partner with 
380   van der Meer: Labour Market Reform in the Dutch Construction Industry 
 
the intention of resolving mutual problems (Schmitter, 1981). These patterns are 
present in both the Dutch and German construction industry, where in the 1980s 
social norms were oriented to equal income distribution and the collectivisation of 
social funds (for Germany, see Matthes, 1993; Swenson, 1989). Also the ‘Bouw-vak-
werk’ is organised according to collective principles. Today, this initiative has, 
among many others, become famous as an example of the ‘jobs before income’ norm. 
This normative attention to employment growth has over time produced mutual trust 
between social partners. In the National Commission, participants have learnt to 
compromise. The debate on ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ encouraged a debate on the rights and 
obligations of the unemployed in the ‘real labour force’ and in the ‘additional labour 
force’. Employers did not want to be dependent upon the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ 
programme (which did not happen). Trade unions wanted firms to acknowledge their 
vacancies, a ‘financial compensation’ for those in the ABB-force, and an ‘obligation 
for effort’ by way of training and work experience (all factors were allowed). The last 
point of dispute refers to the subjective evaluation criteria (here it was decided that 
the local commissions are allowed to take unanimous decisions). The general point to 
be made here is that the adaptation of social norms cannot be treated exogenously, 
but is a product of a bargaining process. ‘Wage norms’ change in the direction of ‘job 
norms’ in accordance with the interests of non-working categories, as it seems in the 
Netherlands, under the conditions of both centralised coordinated wage-setting and 
the participation of the unemployed in decision-making within the trade unions. As a 
consequence, the ‘job before wages’ norm has emerged and social partners have 
succeeded in initiating some solutions to the mismatch in the labour market. 
Fourthly, the outcomes of collective wage-setting should be related to job 
growth and the competitiveness of economies. In the Netherlands, the government 
tries to convince social partners to ‘moderate’ wage costs in order to enhance 
employment, international competitiveness and to link equally the development of 
social benefits to wage levels in the market sector. Social partners prefer to discuss 
‘responsible’ wage-setting to meet common goals. Since 1982, they exchange benefit 
restoration and job growth at a decentralised level, while at the same time they have 
asked the government to throw off the wage intervention yoke. After the recent 
central bi-partite agreements in the Foundation of Labour, ‘A New Course’ (1993) 
and ‘Agenda 2002’ (1997), the associations of employers and employees have 
reaffirmed these principles. As such, there is a trend for industry-level agreements to 
include, in addition to wages and working hours, qualitative issues regarding 
differentiation and tailoring to individual employment conditions, such as training, 
care, labour conditions, flexible opening hours etc. Now it appears that Dutch wage-
setting has on average lower wage costs and better employment growth than the 
German. Although figures are incomplete and wages vary per firm, available studies 
report that gross labour costs (including taxes) of 20.3 ECU in Germany exceed the 
Dutch 15.8 ECU (EIB, 1995: 37). Gross pay in the highest wage category is 14.15 
ECU in Germany compared to 10.07 ECU in the Netherlands (EFBWW, 1995: 9-10). 
As was shown in Table 1, labour productivity is about equal in both countries. Does 
Industrielle Beziehungen, 6. Jg., Heft 3, 1999  381 
 
this imply that the Dutch economy is then more competitive than the German 
economy? This still has to be proven, since Dutch construction wage agreements also 
come at a price, and, according to many companies, are too extended (AVBB, 
1995a). Indeed, the cost of construction labour over the last twenty years has risen 
relatively quicker than in other Dutch sectors (EIB, 1994). Moreover, the lowest 
wage schedule within the construction agreement was until 1995 40% above the legal 
minimum wage (when the government requested the inclusion of an entry scale just 
above the minimum wage level to enhance job creation for lower skilled people). The 
‘wedge’, indicating the difference between gross labour costs (including social taxes) 
and net salaries, comprises 32.2% for an employer and 12.9% for an employee. In 
this percentage, the 14.9% contribution for the sectoral collective funds has been 
included (Van der Meer, 1998: 204). These indicators bring up the question of 
whether the adaptation of the collective agreement results in higher employment 
levels at all. Over the last decade, the number of employees covered by the collective 
agreement for the construction industry has declined from 250,000 (1983) to 150,000 
workers (1995). The current campaign of construction companies to reduce labour 
costs and increase the flexibility of the collective social funds in the sector will 
further enhance cost based competition in the sector. Whether this leads to job 
creation has to be seen. 
A fifth and related argument refers to vocational education and training policies, 
although that has not been documented extensively in the text (see Clarke and Wall, 
1996; Van Lieshout, 1998). Regarding this important issue, the Dutch could learn 
something from reflecting on Germany. During the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ experiment, it 
became clear that, though many training facilities were available, even in a modular 
system, there was continuous conflict of whether the government or the sector should 
bear the responsibility and cost of training the unemployed. Training, moreover, was 
time consuming and costly, since many candidates dropped out or were not 
transferred to a new job, so that the outcomes were neither efficient nor effective. In 
addition, we conclude that training policy and the ‘Bouw-vak-werk’ programme were 
following too separate paths. Even stronger, one may argue that in general, since the 
economic downturn of the early 1980s, vocational education and training policies 
have been undervalued in the Netherlands. In the construction sector, enterprises 
facing recruitment problems and an ageing labour force, have gradually brought 
training and apprenticeship back to the political agenda again. The coverage of 
training, however, is suffering from the free riding of companies and there is 
additionally not a smooth transition from initial vocational training to work 
experience and jobs. As a consequence, the Dutch construction industry currently has 
jobs available, but does not have the trained young personnel to fulfil them. The 
German Dual System, which includes a wide company coverage has an important 
advantage here to offer skilled labour.  
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